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Stone and Valentine (2004) presented masked 17 ms faces in simultaneous 
pairs of one famous and one unfamiliar face. Accuracy in selecting the famous face 
was higher when the famous person was regarded as ‘‘good’’ or liked than when 
regarded as ‘‘evil’’ or disliked. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate this phenomenon, 
but produced a different pattern of results. Experiment 2 investigated alternative 
explanations and found evidence supporting only the effect of response latency: 
responses made soon after stimulus onset were more accurate to liked than to 
disliked faces, whereas responses made after a longer delay were equally accurate 
to disliked faces. It appears that the effect of negative valence was corrected within 
the space of a few hundred milliseconds. Experiment 3, using an affective priming 
paradigm, supported the concept that an early-arising effect of valence is corrected if 
it is misleading to the directed task.  
 Introduction 
There is much evidence that facial expressions can be detected, and can 
influence psychophysiological and behavioural responses, without awareness of the 
expression (e.g., Dimberg & Ohman, 1996; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; 
Johnsen & Hugdahl, 1991, 1993;Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
Niedenthal, 1990; Ohman, Esteves, & Soares, 1995; Robinson, 1998; Saban & 
Hugdahl, 1999; Whalen et al., 1998; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 1994). All of these 
studies presented masked faces for very brief exposure duration [target-to-mask 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of less than 35 ms]. Participants were at chance in 
two-alternative forced-choice tasks of identifying the facial expression, confirming the 
absence of awareness of the expression. The recognition without awareness of 
facial emotional expressions is often interpreted in terms of the importance to the 
individual of detecting the emotion of others. The question then arises of whether 
facial identities, like facial expressions, can be recognised without awareness of 
identity. Literature relevant to this question will be examined. 
Banse (1999) presented the face or name of the participant or a relationship 
partner as the prime stimulus, for 10.5 ms with backward masking, followed after 
SOA of 42 ms by a Chinese letter (re Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Targets were 
evaluated more positively when preceded by the partner’s face/name than by the 
participant’s own face/name: this was the predicted effect, based on the observation 
that a partner tends to be evaluated more positively than the self. The similarity in 
the results obtained from face and name primes was taken as implying that the 
person schemata had been activated. One drawback is that accuracy was well 
above chance in a two-alternative forced-choice of self or other, with a single face or 
name presented under the same masked conditions, so it is not clear that 
participants were entirely unaware of the face or name identity. The limited number 
of stimuli raises the possibility that even if participants were able to perceive only a 
vague outline of the masked face, this could have sufficed to enable a correct 
decision about which of the two persons had been presented. Banse (2001) used an 
affective priming paradigm to investigate whether famous and personally familiar 
faces might be recognised without awareness of identity. Primes were presented for 
the same duration used by Banse (1999) and again, it is not clear that participants 
were entirely unaware of facial identity. 
Stone, Valentine, and Davis (2001) reported that responses to famous faces 
perceived without awareness of facial identity differed according to valence. 
Experiment 1 found that skin conductance responses to masked 17 ms faces were 
higher to the faces of famous persons subsequently evaluated ‘‘good’’ than to the 
faces of persons evaluated ‘‘evil,’’ but did not distinguish between famous and 
unfamiliar faces. (Responses tended to be higher to good faces than to unfamiliar 
faces, but tended to be lower to evil faces than to unfamiliar faces.) When faces 
were exposed for 220 ms, a duration that permits conscious recognition, there was 
an effect of familiarity but no effect of valence: skin conductance responses were 
higher to famous faces than to unfamiliar faces with no difference between ‘‘good’’ 
and ‘‘evil’’ faces. Responses were above chance accuracy in a two-alternative 
forced-choice of ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘evil’’ to masked 17 ms faces of whose identity 
participants were unaware (Experiment 3). 
Stone and Valentine (in press) used a procedure based on Mogg and Bradley 
(1999). Masked 17 ms faces were presented in simultaneous pairs of a famous and 
an unfamiliar face, matched on physical characteristics, in LVF and RVF. These 
were followed by a dot-probe in either LVF or RVF to which participants made a 
speeded two-alternative forced-choice discrimination response. Orientation of 
attention towards the famous face would be demonstrated by faster or more 
accurate responses to the dot-probe when it appeared in the same VF as the famous 
face. Participants were subsequently asked to evaluate each famous person as 
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘evil’’ on a 7-point scale from -3 (very evil) to +3 (very good). Fewer errors 
were made when the dotprobe was presented in the same VF as the famous face 
compared to the opposite VF, as long as the famous person was evaluated as 
neutral or good (evaluation from -1 to 3). A reverse effect was observed, with more 
errors to dot-probes presented in the VF of the famous face, when the famous 
person was evaluated as evil (-3 or -2). The within-item analysis, comparing 
performance between participants who had evaluated the same famous persons as 
good-neutral or evil, confirmed that the effect was due to participants reactions to the 
famous persons and not to any confounding factor. This effect was interpreted as the 
orientation of attention towards the faces of famous persons evaluated as ‘‘good’’ but 
not towards those evaluated as ‘‘evil.’’ 
In a separate awareness check task, the same masked 17 ms famous–
unfamiliar face pairs were presented simultaneously while participants attempted to 
select the famous face. Overall, accuracy at chance supported participant claims of 
no awareness of facial familiarity or identity. At the same time, responses were more 
accurate to the faces of famous persons evaluated as ‘‘good’’ than to the faces of 
persons evaluated as ‘‘evil.’’ This was published as Experiment 1 in Stone and 
Valentine (2004). One limitation is that, without specification of the processes 
underlying the valence effect, the possibility cannot be ruled out that it arose from 
some particular (and unknown) characteristic of the specific stimulus set. For this 
reason it was considered advisable to repeat the experiment using a different set of 
stimuli and a new participant sample. 
Experiment 1 of the present paper was an attempt to replicate the valence 
effect with a larger set of stimuli. As will be seen, Experiment 1 did not replicate the 
valence effect: response accuracy was not consistently lower for negative than 
positive faces. Experiment 2 contrasted three potential explanations for the results of 
Experiment 1 and found evidence supporting only one, the influence of response 
latency. Experiment 3 used an affective priming task to examine another prediction 
derived from the results of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was an attempt to replicate the effect of valence in the 
awareness check task with a larger set of stimuli. Consequent to the change in the 
stimulus set, the terms positive and negative were used in the evaluation of the 
famous persons, replacing the terms good and evil that were used by Stone and 
Valentine (2004). The stimuli were selected on the expectation that each famous 
person would be evaluated as positive by some participants and negative by others. 
Balanced valence ratings would permit a rigorous within-item analysis, in which 
accuracy could be compared for the same famous–unfamiliar face pair between 
participants evaluating the famous person positive vs. negative, ruling out confounds 
arising from systematic differences between famous and unfamiliar faces, or among 
famous faces. If the same famous–unfamiliar face-pair results in different responses 
depending on participants‘ evaluations of the famous person, then this will support 
the claim that responses depend on participants’ attitudes and not on any 
confounding factor. The prediction was that responses would be more accurate to 
the faces of famous persons rated positive than negative. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 46 students at Goldsmiths College, London. Data were 
excluded from eight participants who failed to evaluate a minimum of 10% of the 
famous people as negative in the post-experimental evaluation, since it was 
suspected that these participants might not have been using the scale correctly. 
Data were excluded from five participants who selected more famous faces than 
expected by chance (binomial distribution, one-tailed, cut-off = 55.6%) since for 
these participants, the possibility of some awareness of facial familiarity could not be 
ruled out. The remaining 33 participants were 24female and nine male, aged 
between 18 and 50, mean 23.4, SD 7.9 years. All of the participants had been 
resident in the UK for at least 10 years by self-report to maximise the likelihood of 
knowledge of the famous faces. 
 Stimuli 
Photographs of famous and unknown faces of a uniform quality were digitised 
to produce images of 16 greys, 150 x 200 pixels in size. The stimulus set comprised 
126 pairs of one famous with one unfamiliar face matched on sex, race and 
approximate age. The faces in each pair showed a similar pose and facial 
expression. No data were collected to verify equivalence between the famous and 
unfamiliar faces on distinctiveness, attractiveness, or any other feature on which the 
stimuli might vary. The intention was to perform analyses within-items, with each 
famous person rated as positive by some participants and as negative by others, so 
that systematic variations between famous faces and their paired unfamiliar faces 
could not explain any observed experimental result. Names and examples of stimuli 
are given in Appendices A and B. The average luminance of the famous and 
unfamiliar faces was approximately 5.5 cd/m2, measured on a Minolta CS100 colour 
chronometer at a distance of approximately 1 m from the screen, the distance at 
which participants were seated. 
The mask was a collage of parts of unfamiliar faces, of the same size as the 
famous and unfamiliar faces. 
Apparatus 
A personal computer running MEL2 software was used to display the faces at 
a 640 x 480 screen resolution. Response times and accuracy of response were 
measured and recorded by the computer. 
Design 
The design comprised two independent within-item factors: valence of famous 
person (evaluated by experimental participants) and visual field containing the 
famous face (LVF vs. RVF). The dependent variables were speed and accuracy of 
response. The stimuli were presented in two blocks of 126 trials each, with each face 
pair appearing once in each block. Each famous face appeared in the LVF in one 
block and the RVF in the other block. In each block, there were equal numbers of 
famous faces in the LVF and the RVF. For each famous face, approximately equal 
numbers of participants saw it in the LVF and the RVF in each block. Thus, visual 
field and block were fully counterbalanced across participants. Within each block, the 
sequence of presentation was randomised by the computer for each participant. The 
duration of the forward and backward masks was 100 ms.  
Stone and Valentine (2004) suggested that very few faces could be 
consciously recognised when presented for 17 ms in pairs with a mask similar to that 
used in the present series of experiments. 
Procedure 
Participants carried out the tasks individually in a darkened, air-conditioned 
room. The sequence of events on each trial was as follows: central fixation cross for 
500 ms, forward masks in LVF and RVF for 100 ms, famous and unfamiliar face for 
17 ms, backward masks for 100 ms, then the question ‘‘left or right’’ displayed until a 
response was received. The response was made by pressing one of two keys: to the 
left of the keyboard to indicate the LVF, and to the right of the keyboard to indicate 
the RVF. Each trial was initiated by the response to the previous trial after an inter-
trial interval of 1 s. The response time was calculated from the offset of the backward 
mask. The two faces were approximately 4.5 cm by 6 cm and were presented at a 
distance of 9 cm apart, subtending a visual angle of approximately 4 degrees from 
fixation. The masks were presented in the same screen position as the faces. 
Participants were informed that two faces would be flashed up very briefly, 
one on either side of the screen, preceded and followed by a mask comprised of a 
collage of parts of unfamiliar faces. Each pair of faces would contain one famous 
person and one unfamiliar person, and participants were asked to select on which 
side of the screen the famous face had appeared. Participants were told they would 
find it very difficult to see the real faces and this should be no cause for concern, but 
they should attend carefully to the screen. They were asked to guess if unable to see 
anything of the stimulus faces. Participants were asked to look at the central fixation 
cross before each trial and to respond as quickly as possible. At the end of the task, 
participants were asked whether they had been able to recognise any of the faces 
displayed during the experiment, and were strongly encouraged to guess. 
Following this, participants were shown the famous faces used in the 
experiment, one at a time, and asked to identify each face, either by name or by a 
combination of biographical information that uniquely identified the individual person. 
Faces that were uniquely identified were shown again, one at a time, in a different 
random sequence, and evaluated on a 7-point scale from -3 (very negative) to +3 
(very positive). Participants were asked to evaluate the valence of the person, not 
the face, considering any knowledge they had of the person, and to give their first 
impression. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
Where a participant could not uniquely identify a famous face in the post-
experimental evaluation, the responses for this combination of participant and item 
were excluded from the analysis (19% of trials). No masked 17 ms faces were 
recognised by any participant. Trials were excluded where the response time was 
longer than 5000 ms. Some items had missing data, having been evaluated as either 
positive or negative by all participants, and so 106 items were included in the 
analysis. The participants’ analysis was calculated over these items. The proportion 
of participants giving a negative evaluation to each of the 106 included items ranged 
from 0.06 to 0.94, mean 0.30, SD 0.2.  
For each participant, mean accuracy was calculated over the faces rated as 
positive and separately over the faces rated as negative (faces evaluated as zero 
were classified as positive). So two values were calculated for each participant: 
accuracy-positivep (mean = 50.5, standard error = .7) and accuracy-negativep (mean 
= 50.5, SE = 1.1). Similarly, for each item, mean accuracy was calculated over all 
participants rating the famous person as positive and separately over all participants 
rating the person as negative. So two values were calculated for each item: 
accuracy-positivei (mean = 51.1, SE = 1.0) and accuracy-negativei (mean = 50.1, SE 
= 1.5). If a famous person was evaluated as positive and negative by unequal 
numbers of participants, different numbers of participants contributed to the 
calculation of accuracy-positivei and accuracy-negativei. 
Overall accuracy for all famous faces did not differ from chance, one-sample 
ti(105) = 0.88, ns, and tp(32) = 1.15, ns. Paired-samples t tests revealed no effect of 
valence, ti(105) = 0.60, ns, and tp(32) = 0.06, ns, in contrast to the effect reported by 
Stone and Valentine (2004). 
One obvious procedural difference is that participants in Experiment 1 of 
Stone and Valentine (2004) had performed a separate attention orientation task 
before the awareness check, whereas participants in the present study had not. The 
attention orientation task had presented the same masked 17 ms face pairs so that 
participants had gained experience in perceiving the stimuli. This suggests that a 
comparison of blocks 1 and 2 might be interesting.  ANOVA was performed with two 
within-participants and within-items factors of block (1 vs. 2) and valence. The main 
effect of block was non-significant, Fi(1, 105) = 1.43, ns, and Fp(1, 32) = 4.11, p = 
.051, but the interaction with valence was significant, Fi(1, 105) = 4.78, p < .04, and 
Fp(1, 32) = 5.50, p < .03. Paired-samples t tests revealed that for negative faces, 
responses tended to be more accurate in block 1 (meani = 53.4, SE = 2.2) than in 
block 2 (meani = 46.8, SE = 2.3), ti(105) = 1.96, p < .06, and tp(32) = 2.62, p < .02. 
For positive faces, accuracy did not differ between block 1 (meani = 50.2, SE = 1.3) 
and block 2 (meani = 52.1, SE = 1.5), ti(105) = .93, ns, and tp(32) = .66, ns. 
Mean accuracy of responses to negative and positive faces was calculated for 
each chunk of five trials (to provide a more stable view of the data) over all 
participants and items. Accuracy was negatively correlated with chunk for negative 
faces, r(51) = -0.33, p < .02, but tended to be positively correlated with chunk for 
positive faces, r(51) = 0.24, p < .09, confirming that response accuracy for negative 
faces, but not positive faces, declined as the task progressed. There are three 
possible reasons why responses to negative faces were less accurate towards the 
end of the task than at the start and these will be considered in turn. 
Practice 
The practice explanation proposes that participants became better able to 
extract information from masked faces as the task progressed, so that the valence 
associated with each face was more strongly activated, leading to the decline in 
accuracy of responses to negative faces. The practice explanation would be 
consistent with Experiment 1 of Stone and Valentine (2004) in which a separate 
attention orientation task before the awareness check had presented the same 
masked famous-unfamiliar face pairs. There is some empirical evidence to support 
the practice account. Dagenbach, Carr, and Wilhelmsen (1989, Experiment 1) 
measured participants’ exposure thresholds for chance performance in a 
presence/absence decision on briefly exposed masked words, before starting the 
experimental trials. Participants were tested again on the same presence/absence 
decision, at the same threshold exposure duration, after the experimental trials were 
complete. They found that for a sizeable group of participants (15 of 52, 
approximately 29%) accuracy in the presence/absence decision was above chance 
in the post-experimental re-test when it had been at chance in the pre-experimental 
threshold setting procedure, suggesting that some participants’ ability to detect 
briefly exposed masked stimuli had improved as a result of practice. In the present 
experiment, increasing ability to derive valence from masked 17 ms famous faces 
could explain why the accuracy of responses to negative faces declined throughout 
the task. 
Strategy 
Comments made by participants during debriefing suggested that they had 
used different strategies for attempting to perceive the masked faces at the start of 
the task and towards the end. Many reported that to begin with, they had tried very 
hard to see anything they could, but this was so difficult they had given up and 
simply guessed their responses. It makes sense that deliberate effort would be 
reduced towards the end of a task in which there was no feedback or evidence that 
effort improved accuracy.  
Relevant to this possibility, Snodgrass, Shevrin, and Kopka (1993) reported a 
study investigating the different strategies that participants might adopt for engaging 
with a task involving the perception of briefly exposed masked stimuli. Participants 
were asked to decide which of four words, two with pleasant meanings and two with 
unpleasant meanings, had been presented on each trial, using one of two strategies. 
The Pop strategy asked participants to ‘‘look where the word is presented and say 
whatever word pops into your mind.’’ The Look strategy asked participants to ‘‘look 
very hard where the word is presented. . . for anything you can see. . . use these 
cues when making your decision’’ (p. 196). Strategy interacted with word meaning: 
pleasant words tended to be identified more accurately than unpleasant words in the 
Pop strategy, whereas the converse was observed in the Look strategy.  
The Pop strategy gave results similar to the pattern observed in Stone and 
Valentine (2004) and the non-significant trend in the present Experiment 1, block 2, 
that is, less accurate responses to evil-negative faces than to good-positive faces. 
The Look strategy gave results similar to those obtained in Experiment 1, block 1, a 
tendency to more accurate responses to negative faces. This raises the possibility 
that something similar to the Look strategy was used in Experiment 1, block 1, and 
something similar to the Pop strategy in Experiment 1, block 2, which would be 
consistent with the comments made by participants during debriefing. There are 
other reports of strategy affecting responses in a task involving perception of briefly 
exposed masked stimuli (e.g., Dagenbach et al., 1989; Kahan, 2000). It seems that 
the failure to observe the predicted valence effect consistently in Experiment 1 may 
have been due to participants’ strategies.  
Response latency 
In addition to practice and strategy, a third possibility is that response latency 
measured from stimulus face onset may be a factor, since participants tended to 
respond faster as the task progressed. A substantial literature on affective priming is 
relevant to this possibility and will be briefly described. 
Affective priming refers to the phenomenon in which responses to a valenced 
target stimulus are facilitated (inhibited) by the prior presentation of a prime stimulus 
of the same (opposing) valence to the target. Affective priming appears to be a 
reliable phenomenon, having been observed using words, objects and faces as 
primes; using words and pictures as targets; using evaluative decision, lexical 
decision, degraded word identification, and word pronunciation as the task; and 
using response time and accuracy as the dependent variable (see Fazio, 2001, for a 
review). Affective priming has been observed with masked primes of whose identity 
participants were not aware (e.g., Banse, 2001; Bargh, Litt, Pratto, & Spielman, 
1989; see Fazio, 2001, for a review). There is substantial evidence that attitudes 
towards primes are activated automatically, without deliberate evaluation intent (e.g., 
Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Bargh et al., 1989; Hermans, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 1994, 2001). Attitudes appear to be activated very rapidly, with  
rime to target SOA between 0 and 300 ms (e.g., Banse, 1999, 2001; Bargh et al., 
1996; Bargh et al., 1989; De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; De Houwer, Hermans, & 
Eelen, 1998; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans et al., 1994, Hermans, De Houwer, & 
Eelen, 2001; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Musch & 
Klauer, 2001). 
There is also evidence that the effect of the attitude evoked by the prime is 
corrected, where it is misleading with regard to the required response to the target. 
Several studies have reported significant effects at short SOA of up to 300 ms that 
are absent at longer SOA, which suggests that the correction process requires some 
duration (e.g., De Houwer et al., 1998; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans et al., 1994, 
2001; Klauer et al., 1997; see Fazio, 2001, for a review).  
In the present Experiment 1, it is possible that lower accuracy of responses to 
negative than positive faces appeared in block 2 because responses were faster 
(block 1 mean response time = 851 ms, block 2 mean = 622 ms), and so were 
formulated during a period when the negative valence of the famous person 
influenced participants to select the unfamiliar face. With the longer response latency 
in Experiment 1, block 1, the influence of negative valence had been corrected 
before the responses were selected, and so response accuracy was not lower for 
negative faces than for positive faces. 
Re-analysis of Experiment 1 
The block design of Experiment 1 permits a comparison of shorter latency 
responses with longer latency responses in blocks 1 and 2. If only block has a 
significant effect, this would argue against the response latency account. If only 
response latency has a significant effect, this would make the practice account less 
likely. It is less easy to investigate the strategy account since participants were not 
asked on a trial-by-trial basis which strategy they had used. In addition, strategy may 
have been confounded with practice such that the Look strategy was preferred in 
block 1 and the Pop strategy in block 2, as suggested by participants during 
debriefing, or confounded with response latency, such that the Look strategy was 
used on longer latency trials and the Pop strategy on shorter latency trials. 
Responses were divided into short latency and long latency around the grand 
median response time of 604ms. The mean accuracy of short and long latency 
responses was calculated for each participant, and separately for each item, by 
block and valence. The data were analysed in separate ANOVA for participants and 
items, with factors of valence, block (1 vs. 2) and response latency (short vs. long). 
Two participants and 34items had missing data and were excluded from the ANOVA. 
See Table 1 and Figure 1.  
Table 1: Mean accuracy (and standard error) of fast and slow responses in 
the first and second block of Experiment 1, for positive and negative items. 
 Positive Negative 
 Fast Slow Total Fast Slow Total 
Block 1 50.2 (2.9) 49.3 (2.1)  49.7 (2.6)  49.7 (4.0)  56.1 (3.3)  52.9 (2.5) 
Block 2 51.8 (2.3)  52.0 (3.0)  51.9 (2.0)  45.5 (2.9)  53.0 (3.8)  49.2 (2.5) 
























Figure 1: accuracy of responses by valence and response latency (A) and by 
valence and block (B) in Experiment 1. Bars represent standard errors. 
The two-way interaction of valence with response latency approached 
significance, Fi(1, 71) = 3.25, p < 0.08, and Fp(1, 30) = 8.20, p < 0.01. See Fig. 1A. 
Paired-samples t tests investigated the interaction, including the maximum number 
of items and participants for whom data was complete (collapsing over block). For 
negative faces, shorter latency responses (meani = 46.1, SE = 2.7) were less 
accurate than longer latency responses (meani = 57.1, SE = 2.2), ti(100) = 3.25, p < 
0.005, and tp(32) = 2.53, p < 0.02. For positive faces, there was no difference in 
accuracy between shorter latency responses (meani = 50.9, SE = 1.4) and longer 
latency responses (meani = 50.0, SE = 1.5), ti(100) = 0.46, ns, and tp(32) = 1.26, ns. 
Shorter latency responses tended to be less accurate to negative than positive 
faces, ti(100) = 1.69, ns, and tp(32) = 1.60, ns, whereas longer latency responses 
were more accurate to negative faces, ti(100) = 2.53, p < 0.02, and tp(32) = 2.87, p < 
0.01. This is consistent with the response latency account, but could also be 
consistent with the strategy account if the Look strategy tended to be used on longer 
latency responses and the Pop strategy on shorter latency responses. 
The two-way interaction of half with valence was non-significant, Fi(1, 71) = 
2.08, ns, and Fp(1, 30) = 2.78, ns. See Fig. 1B. Paired-samples t tests have already 
been reported. Responses tended to be more accurate to negative faces in block 1, 
and more accurate for positive faces in block 2. This is consistent with the practice 
account, but could also be consistent with the strategy account if Look strategy was 
used predominantly in block 1 while the Pop strategy was used predominantly in 
block 2.  
This inconclusive pattern of results does not enable a decision between the 
three accounts. Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the accounts directly by 
manipulating strategy, practice and response latency as independent factors. 
Over-correction of valence? 
Another observation is worth mentioning: In Experiment 1, longer latency 
responses were more accurate to negative than positive faces. This could have 
arisen if the correction for the biasing effect of negative valence went too far and 
resulted in over-correction. Such over-correction has been observed in studies of 
affective priming. For example, Glaser and Banaji (1999), in a series of six 
experiments, reported reverse affective priming, that is, slower responses to targets 
of valence congruent with the prime than to targets of incongruent valence. They 
attributed this reverse priming to an over-correction for the biasing effect of the 
primes (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Stapel, Koomen, & Zeelenberg, 1998; 
Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). Based on the observation of 
reverse priming with prime-target SOA as short as 150 ms, they theorised that the 
over-correction was an automatic effect, not requiring deliberate intent by the 
participants. Klauer et al. (1997, Experiment 2) also reported reverse affective 
priming in an evaluative decision task, but only at a longer SOA of 1200 ms, and not 
at shorter SOA of 0 and 100 ms. It seems that the correction for the biasing influence 
of the primes takes some short time to develop. Glaser and Banaji’s (1999) reverse 
priming was obtained at SOA of 150 and 300 ms, falling within the 100 ms SOA and 
the 1200 ms SOA of Klauer et al. (1997, Experiment 2) that observed congruent and 
reverse priming, respectively. 
The Klauer et al. (1997) study also manipulated the proportion of prime-target 
pairs of consistent evaluation (the consistency proportion). The weakest reverse 
priming was observed with consistency proportion of 0.75, in which condition the 
primes had predictive value for the evaluative decision to the targets. Correction for 
the biasing effects of the primes would have been less useful with such a high 
consistency proportion, so the weaker reverse priming in this condition fits the 
correction theory. Under the same logic, the strongest reverse priming should have 
been observed when the consistency proportion was 0.25, where the prime has least 
predictive value for the evaluative decision to the targets. In fact, the strongest 
reverse priming was observed with consistency proportion of 0.50, although the 
difference between this and the 0.25 consistency proportion was very small. Klauer 
et al. (1997) suggested that inconsistent pairs would have been more easily 
observed with 0.50 consistency proportion, since in this condition, consistent and 
inconsistent pairs would follow each other frequently during the experimental priming 
task.  
In Stone and Valentine (2004), the effect of negative valence of the famous 
person was to cause participants to select the paired unfamiliar face, contrary to the 
task instruction. There was a similar tendency, though non-significant, in the shorter 
latency trials of Experiment 1 (see Section 2.2.4). Thus, the effect of valence was 
misleading to the required response, which implies that the effect of valence should 
have been corrected, given sufficient time. More accurate responses to negative 
faces than to positive faces on longer latency trials in Experiment 1 is consistent with 
the proposal that over-correction, requiring some duration, may occur.  
This over-correction hypothesis was investigated by introducing a new 
affective priming task, described as Experiment 3. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment investigated the response latency, practice and strategy 
accounts that were offered as possible explanations for the failure to observe 
consistently lower response accuracy to negative faces than positive faces in 
Experiment 1. The post-experimental evaluation scale was altered to use the terms 
liked and disliked instead of positive and negative, on the expectation that the new 
terms would focus participants’ attention on their personal attitude towards the target 
famous persons. 
Response latency was investigated by varying the duration of the backward 
mask between 500 and 100 ms. The duration of 500 ms should have ensured that 
responses were selected after the effect of valence had been corrected, and so 
disliked faces should be selected at least as often as liked faces, consistent with 
block 1 of Experiment 1. The duration of 100 ms, combined with instructions to 
respond without thinking too long, should have ensured that responses were decided 
before the correction took place, and so responses to disliked faces should be less 
accurate than responses to liked faces. This would be consistent with block 2 of 
Experiment 1. Half the participants in each backward mask condition were instructed 
to use the Pop strategy and the other half the Look strategy. If strategy is the major 
determinant of responses then the Pop strategy should result in higher accuracy for 
liked faces than disliked faces throughout, while the Look strategy should result in 
the opposite effect. If the practice account is correct, then disliked faces should be 
selected at least as often as liked faces in the first half, but less often than liked 
faces in the second half. 
Method 
Only the changes from Experiment 1 will be described. 
Participants 
Participants were 64 undergraduate students at Goldsmiths College, London. 
All had watched UK television for at least 5 years, by self-report, to maximise the 
likelihood of knowledge of the famous faces. Data were excluded from eight 
participants who lacked familiarity with the famous faces or failed to comply with 
experimental instructions. Data were excluded from 18 participants who selected 
more famous faces than expected by chance (binomial distribution, one-tailed, cutoff 
= 55%, a = .05) since for these participants the possibility of some awareness of 
facial familiarity cannot be ruled out. Of these 18 participants, 15 were in the 500 ms 
backward mask condition and 3 in the 100 ms backward mask condition. This is 
consistent with the response latency account: disliked faces would be selected less 
accurately with 100 ms than with 500 ms backward mask, so overall accuracy would 
be higher at 500 ms. 
The remaining 38 participants were 35 female and three male, aged between 
18 and 36, mean 22.0, SD 5.6 years. There were 23 participants in the 500 ms 
backward mask condition and 15 in the 100 ms backward mask condition. More 
participants performed the 500 ms backward mask condition, in which no effect of 
valence was predicted, than the 100 ms mask condition, in which lower accuracy of 
responses to disliked faces than to liked faces was predicted, in order that a null 
effect in the 100 ms backward mask condition could not be attributed to lack of 
power in the statistical analysis. 
Stimuli 
These comprised facial photographs of 80 celebrities, of whom 40 had been 
included in the items analysis of Experiment 1, and the remaining 40 were new 
stimuli. The new celebrities were selected on the expectation that they would be 
liked by some participants and disliked by others (this entailed avoiding popular 
comedians, criminals and military dictators).  
Design 
There were two within-participant and within-item factors, valence and half, 
and two between participant and within-item factors, strategy (Look vs. Pop) and 
mask duration (500 vs. 100 ms). The dependent variable was accuracy of response, 
and a correct response was scored by selecting the famous face in a pair. 
Each face pair was presented once in each of four blocks giving 320 trials 
altogether. The position of the famous face was counterbalanced as follows. The 
faces were randomly divided into two sets. Half the participants in each strategy and 
backward mask condition saw one set in the LVF in blocks 1 and 3 and the RVF in 
blocks 2 and 4, and the other set in the RVF in blocks 1 and 3 and the LVF in blocks 
2 and 4. For the other half of the participants in each condition, these positions were 
reversed. Thus, face position was fully counterbalanced over the factors of block, 
strategy and mask duration. This design ensured equal numbers of famous faces in 
LVF and RVF in each block and minimised the likelihood that the same face would 
be presented twice in succession. 
Procedure 
The major change from previous experiments was the addition of the specific 
instructions. In the Look condition, participants were asked to ‘‘try hard to see 
anything you can of the faces that flash up. Most people find that they can see 
nothing at first, but as the experiment progresses, they are able to see bits of the 
faces. Some people can see the outline of a face, or the hair, or maybe the eyes or 
the mouth. Please try hard to see anything you can, and use what you see to make a 
guess about which of the 2 faces is famous.’’ In the Pop condition, participants were 
asked to ‘‘relax, and not make any effort to see the faces. Just look at the cross in 
the centre, relax, let the faces flash up, and let the answer pop into your head.’’ In 
both the Look and Pop conditions, participants were told, ‘‘It is very important that 
you follow this strategy because the purpose of the experiment is to contrast the 
effects of different strategies.’’ In the 100 ms backward mask condition, participants 
were asked to respond on each trial without thinking too long, and this instruction 
was emphasised after the practice trials had been completed.  
Results and discussion 
Where a participant was unable to uniquely identify a famous face in the post-
experimental evaluation, the trials for this combination of participant and item were 
excluded from the analysis (16% of trials). If a face was correctly identified during the 
experimental trials then all four trials for this face were excluded (1.3% of trials). 
Trials were excluded where the response time was longer than 5000 ms or shorter 
than 200 ms from face offset (<1% of trials). For each participant, liked and disliked 
faces were selected according to the participant’s own ratings. For each item, 
participants who liked and disliked the item were selected according to the same 
ratings. Faces evaluated as zero were classified as liked in order to distinguish 
between disliked persons and the rest. Many items had missing data, having been 
evaluated as liked or disliked by all participants in a condition (mask duration · 
strategy), so the item analysis consisted of 29 items. The participant analysis was 
calculated over these items. The proportion of participants evaluating each of the 
included famous persons as disliked ranged from 0.18 to 0.78, mean = 0.44, so the 
included items were roughly balanced between liked and disliked. 
ANOVA was performed by participants and by items, with valence and half as 
within-participant and within-item factors, and strategy and mask duration as 
between-participant and within-item factors. The main effect of mask duration was 
non-significant, Fi(1, 28) = 2.13, ns, and Fp(1, 34) = 3.27, p < 0.08, but the interaction 
of mask duration with valence was significant by items, Fi(1, 28) = 4.85, p < 0.04, 
and approached significance by participants, Fp(1, 34) = 3.00, p < 0.10. See Figure 2 











Figure 2: accuracy in the 500ms (long response latency) and 100ms (short 
response latency) backward mask conditions of Experiment 2. Bars represent 
standard errors.  
The interaction was investigated using t tests with a set at 0.025 (one-tailed) 
for each individual comparison. With mask duration of 500 ms, responses to disliked 
faces and liked faces were equally accurate, ti(28) = 0.97, ns, and tp(22) = 0.64, ns. 
With mask duration of 100 ms, responses to disliked faces were less accurate than 
responses to liked faces, ti(28) = 2.05, p = 0.025, and tp(14) = 2.28, p < 0.02. 
Responses to disliked faces were less accurate at 100 ms than at 500 ms mask 
duration, significant by items and marginal by participants, ti(28) = 2.32, p < 0.02, 
and tp(36) = 1.90, p = 0.033. Responses to liked faces were equally accurate at 500 
and at 100 ms, ti(28) = 0.61, ns, and tp(36) = 0.16, ns. 
The two-way interaction of half with mask duration approached significance by 
participants and items, Fi(1, 28) = 3.52, p < 0.08, and Fp(1, 34) = 3.43, p < 0.08. 
Inspection of Table 2 reveals a tendency for accuracy to increase from the first half 
to the second half at 500 ms mask duration, but to decrease at 100 ms mask 
duration. The reason for this interaction is not obvious and so it will not be 
interpreted. The two-way interaction of mask duration with strategy was non- 
significant, by items, Fi(1, 28) = 2.37, ns, and only marginally significant by 
participants, Fp(1, 34) = 3.83, p < 0.06, and so will not be interpreted. No other 
effects reached significance, all Fi and Fp < 1.9, p > 0.18. In particular, neither 
strategy nor task half interacted with valence, all Fi and Fp < 1. 
Table 2: Mean accuracy (and standard error) of responses to disliked and 
liked items at 100 and 500 ms backward mask duration, under the Look and Pop 
strategies, in the first and second half of Experiment 2.  
Disliked Liked 
500ms 100ms 500ms 100ms 
Pop Look Total Pop Look Total Pop Look Total Pop Look Total 
n=13  n=10 n=23  n=8  n=7  n=15  n=13  n=10  n=23  n=8  n=7  n=15 













































































These results support the prediction based on the response latency account. 
With 100 ms backward mask it was predicted that responses would be decided 
before the effect of negative valence was corrected, so that responses to disliked 
faces would be less accurate than responses to liked faces, and this effect was 
observed. In contrast, with 500 ms backward mask, it was predicted that the effect of 
negative valence would have been corrected before responses were decided, and 
indeed responses to disliked and liked faces were equally accurate. The ANOVA 
was significant in the items analysis, which is the more important analysis since it 
rules out potential confounds arising from physical differences between famous and 
unfamiliar faces, or between liked and disliked famous faces. The ANOVA was 
marginally significant in the participants analysis, offering weak support for the main 
items analysis.  
The factors of strategy and task half showed no reliable effects, in particular 
failing to interact with valence, providing no support for either the strategy or the 
practice explanations. Accuracy of responses to disliked faces was not lower under 
the Pop strategy than under the Look strategy. Accuracy of responses to disliked 
faces did not decline with practice, revealed by the null effect of task half. 
A potential confound must be addressed. Response latency was manipulated 
by varying the duration of the backward mask, so it is possible that the mask 
duration rather than the response latency was responsible for the pattern of results. 
Perhaps the 100 ms backward mask was less effective than the 500 ms backward 
mask, and a less effective mask may have allowed valence to become activated, so 
that valence influenced participant responses with 100 ms backward mask but not 
with 500 ms backward mask. This must be regarded as unlikely for three distinct 
reasons. First, the backward mask duration was 100 ms throughout Experiment 1 
and yet there was an interaction of response latency with valence, suggesting that 
response latency rather than backward mask duration is the key factor. Second, 
Esteves and Ohman (1993) reported that the duration of the backward mask 
(between 30 and 120 ms) had no effect on the likelihood of conscious perception of 
a masked facial emotional expression. Third, in the present experiment, participants 
were more likely to be aware of the identity of a masked 17 ms face at 500 ms mask 
duration (item mean percentage conscious recognition = 2.7%) than with 100 ms 
mask duration (item mean = 0.2%), Wilcoxon signed-ranks zi(29) = 2.69, p < 0.01, 
and Mann–Whitney zp(37) = 2.42, p < 0.05, which contradicts the proposal that 
masking is more effective at 500 ms than 100 ms mask duration. 
Experiment 2 supported the response latency account but not the practice 
account or the strategy account. It therefore appears that neither practice nor 
strategy significantly moderated the effect of lower response accuracy to disliked 
than liked faces, and the only relevant factor was response latency from face onset. 
This is consistent with the affective priming literature in which effects of valence are 
swiftly activated and swiftly corrected. It is supposed that the effect of negative 
valence was corrected because it led participants to make incorrect responses by 
selecting the paired unfamiliar face instead of the famous face. 
Experiment 3 
A new affective priming task was introduced to investigate the possibility that 
the higher response accuracy to negative faces than positive faces that was 
observed on longer latency trials in Experiment 1 was due to over-correction for the 
negative valence of the famous face. The affective priming task was given to a 
subset of the participants in Experiment 2 and was always performed after the 
original task and before participant evaluations of the famous persons.  
Prime stimuli in Experiment 3 were masked 17 ms faces of famous persons. 
Targets were clearly visible words of pleasant or unpleasant meaning, and the 
required response was a pleasant–unpleasant decision to the target word. Normal 
affective priming suggests facilitation of responses to target words of the same 
valence as the prime face, that is, liked faces should result in faster responses to 
pleasant words and disliked faces in faster responses to unpleasant words. 
However, if the biasing effect of the prime face were corrected, there might be no 
interaction of prime and target valence. Further, if the biasing effect of the prime face 
were overcorrected, then the result would be faster responses to targets of valence 
incongruent with the prime face. It is necessary to examine closely the conditions 
that might be required for correction to occur. 
The first condition is that the valence evoked by the prime face should be 
recognised as misleading with respect to the required response to the target. The 
required target response was an evaluative decision (pleasant or unpleasant), and 
the prime and target valence were congruent and incongruent on approximately 
equal numbers of trials, so the prime valence was in fact misleading with respect to 
the required response to the target. The question is whether this would be 
recognised. In this respect, a complication is introduced by the different strategies 
used in Experiment 2. Given that Experiment 2 always preceded Experiment 3 in the 
same experimental session, and evidence that the effect of strategy can carry 
forward into a subsequent task (e.g., Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dagenbach et al., 
1989; Kahan, 2000), it is necessary to examine whether the Look and Pop strategies 
predict equivalent correction for the biasing effect of the prime face. 
The Look strategy in the original task instructed participants to look hard at 
the stimulus faces and use any partial perception as the basis for their responses. 
This instruction seems likely to have focused deliberate attention on the masked 
faces and it may be supposed that this focus of attention carried forward into 
Experiment 3 (e.g., Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dagenbach et al., 1989; Kahan, 2000). 
So in Experiment 3, the combination of deliberate attention to the masked faces, the 
instruction to use them as a basis for the response, and equal numbers of valence-
congruent and valence-incongruent trials, should have led to the recognition that 
prime valence was misleading for the required target response. This should have 
prompted an automatic correction process. In contrast, the Pop strategy asked 
participants to relax, not make any effort to see the faces, and let the answer pop 
into their heads. In Experiment 3, this instruction seems likely to have removed the 
deliberate focus of attention from using the masked faces as a basis for the 
response, in which case, the irrelevance of the masked faces to the instructed task 
would have been less obvious. Hence, correction for the effect of prime valence was 
less likely to occur. This line of reasoning predicts that reverse affective priming 
(faster responses to target words of valence incongruent with the prime face) should 
be stronger under the Look strategy than under the Pop strategy. 
The second condition for correction of the biasing effect of prime valence is 
sufficient time for the correction to occur. The theorised correction occurred in the 
original task of Experiment 1 on long latency trials but not on short latency trials. 
However, faces were presented in simultaneous pairs in Experiment 1, and were 
presented singly and centrally in Experiment 3. It is quite possible that correction 
could occur more quickly under the easier conditions of Experiment 3. Given that 
Glaser and Banaji (1999) reported reverse affective priming with SOA of only 150 
ms, it is possible that correction could occur even at the shorter prime-target SOA of 
100 ms in the present Experiment 3. Therefore, no prediction was made for the 
effect of backward mask duration. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 44 undergraduate students at Goldsmiths College, London, 
comprising all except the first 20 from Experiment 2. Data from 11 participants were 
not analysed for reasons detailed below in the Results section. The remaining 33 
participants were 26 female and seven male, aged between 18 and 41, mean 22.9, 
SD 6.7 years. There were 17 participants in the 100 ms backward mask condition 
and 16 participants in the 500 ms backward mask condition; 18 participants in the 
Look strategy condition and 15 participants in the Pop condition.  
Stimuli 
Ten of the faces used in Experiment 2 were selected as primes on the basis 
that they were correctly identified by over 90% of the first group of participants in 
Experiment 2, with roughly equal numbers of participants evaluating each face as 
liked and disliked. Names are presented in Appendix A. Another five unfamiliar faces 
were chosen to act as primes on filler trials. The mask was the same as used in 
Experiment 2. 
The targets were four words: rose, pleasure, pain, and fighting. The two 
positive and two negative targets were balanced on word length and word frequency. 
The targets were those used by Snodgrass et al. (1993). 
Design 
There were three independent factors. Backward mask duration (100 vs. 500 
ms) and strategy (Look vs. Pop) were between-participants and within-items, and 
congruence (face-valence congruent or incongruent with word-valence) was within-
participants and within-items. Backward mask duration for each participant was the 
same as Experiment 2. Strategy was implemented by the instructions given to 
participants in Experiment 2 that always preceded Experiment 3. Each famous face 
was rated as liked or disliked by each participant after the affective priming task, by 
the procedure described in Experiment 2. 
Each prime face was presented four times, once for each target word, making 
a total of 60 trials. Trials were presented in a different random sequence for each 
participant. The required response to the target was a two-alternative forced-choice 
of pleasant or unpleasant. The keys assigned to the two response options were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure 
Participants carried out the affective priming task following the original 
awareness check task, and before giving their evaluations of the famous persons. 
Four practice trials preceded the 60 experimental trials. The participant initiated the 
sequence of trials by pressing a key. The presentation of stimuli on each trial was as 
follows: forward mask for 100 or 500 ms, prime face for 17 ms, backward mask for 
100 or 500 ms, and target word presented until the participant responded. Each 
subsequent trial was initiated by the response to the previous trial after an interval of 
1 s. 
Participants were informed that a series of words, some pleasant and some 
unpleasant, would be displayed one at a time on the screen. They were asked to 
respond by pressing one of two keys depending on whether the target word was 
pleasant or unpleasant and to respond as quickly as possible. The assignment of 
keys to responses was counterbalanced across participants. They were asked to 
report immediately any faces that were consciously recognised, even if recognition 
was very uncertain and even if the name could not be recalled. After completion of 
the experimental trials, participants gave their evaluations of the famous persons, as 
described in Experiment 2. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
Results and discussion 
Trials were excluded if the response to the target word was incorrect, if the 
response was slower than 1500 ms, if the participant was aware of the identity of the 
prime face during the experimental trials, or if the participant could not identify the 
prime face in the post-experimental rating. Eleven participants had only a single face 
rated liked or disliked of whose identity they were unaware during the experimental 
trials, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. Other data were considered 
valid and were included in the analysis.  
ANOVA was performed by participants and by items with three factors of 
backward mask (500 vs. 100 ms), strategy (Look vs. Pop) and congruence (face-
valence congruent or incongruent with word-valence). The dependent variable was 
mean response time for correct responses to target words. The approach of 
collapsing the two factors of word-valence and face-valence into a single factor of 
congruence is a common approach (e.g., De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; De Houwer 
et al., 1998; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 1997; Musch 
& Klauer, 2001). This approach serves to enhance the clarity of the results and 
discussion by focusing on the experimental hypothesis. Exposition of any main 
effects of face-valence and word-valence that might be present would have 
detracted from the major hypothesis of the experiment. 
The main effect of backward mask duration was significant, Fi(1, 9) = 124, p < 
0.001, and Fp(1, 29) = 24.9, p < 0.001, showing slower responses in the 500 ms 
backward mask condition than in the 100 ms condition. The two-way interaction of 
strategy with congruence was significant, Fi(1, 9) = 6.91, p < 0.03, and Fp(1, 29) = 
7.03, p < 0.02. All other effects were non-significant, all Fi and Fp < 1. The interaction 
was investigated with paired-samples t tests for each strategy. Under the Pop 
strategy, there was a tendency to faster responses in the congruent condition, ti(9) = 
1.77, ns, and tp(14) = 1.80, ns, that is, normal affective priming. Under the Look 
strategy, there was a tendency to faster responses in the incongruent condition, ti(9) 
= 2.09, p < 0.07, and tp(17) = 2.17, p < 0.05, that is, reverse affective priming. See 
Table 3 and Figure 3. 
Table 3: mean response time (and standard error) for correct responses to 
valence-congruent and valence-incongruent target words, under the Pop and Look 
strategies, with 100 and 500 ms backward mask, in Experiment 3. 
 Look Pop 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
100 ms mask 639 (19)  602 (15)  609 (14)  643 (9) 
500 ms mask 813 (32) 785 (23)  803 (21)  825 (17) 
Mean 726 (21) 693 (14)  706 (13) 734 (11) 
  
The pattern of results supports the prediction that reverse affective priming 
would be stronger under the Look strategy than under the Pop strategy. This is 
consistent with the concept that the Look strategy would focus attention on the 
misleading nature of the prime’s valence, and so engender a process of correction 
for the biasing effect of the prime, while the Pop strategy would focus less attention 
on the prime, and so engender a weaker (or no) correction process. The observation 
of this result in the item analysis rules out confounds based on variation in some 
visual characteristics of the faces. Differential priming of valenced target words 
according to whether the same prime face was liked or disliked (by different 
participants) confirms that the effect was due to recognition of the unique face 
identity. 
Figure 3: mean response time in the valence-congruent and valence-
incongruent conditions of Experiment 3 (affective priming), under the Look and Pop 













The interaction of the direction of affective priming (normal or reverse) with 
strategy was unaffected by the duration of the backward mask. It appears that the 
theorised correction for the biasing effect of prime valence that occurred under the 
Look strategy was as effective at the shorter backward mask duration (SOA of 117 
ms) as at the longer backward mask duration (SOA of 517 ms). This might seem 
inconsistent with the results of Experiment 2, that reported an apparent correction for 
the biasing effect of negative valence at 500 ms backward mask duration but not at 
100 ms mask duration, but it should be noted that Experiment 2 presented faces in 
simultaneous pairs while Experiment 3 presented faces singly and centrally. It is 
reasonable to suppose that processing of two faces simultaneously would be slowed 
in comparison with processing of a single face, so that the theorised over-correction 
could have occurred with the shorter backward mask duration in Experiment 3 but 
not in Experiment 2. Another issue is that the over-correction for the biasing effect of 
prime valence must have occurred before the response on each trial was decided, 
but it is not clear at exactly what point this happened. In Experiment 3, the response 
to the target word was formulated some time after the word was presented, but the 
lag is unknown. The lag would have allowed some extra time for the biasing effect of 
prime valence to be corrected. 
General discussion 
Experiment 1 was an attempt to replicate the effect observed by Stone and 
Valentine (2004) that detection of familiarity from masked 17 ms faces was more 
accurate when the famous persons were subsequently evaluated positively than 
when they were evaluated negatively. A different pattern of results was observed, 
with the accuracy of responses to negative faces declining throughout the task. 
Feedback from participants during debriefing and theoretical considerations 
suggested three potential explanations: practice, strategy and response latency. 
The results of Experiment 2 supported only the response latency account. 
With short response latency (100 ms backward mask duration), responses were less 
accurate to disliked faces than to liked faces, while at long response latency (500 ms 
backward mask duration), responses were equally accurate to liked and disliked 
faces. Responses to disliked faces were less accurate at short than at long response 
latency. There was no effect of practice or strategy. The lower accuracy of 
responses to negative faces at short response latency was attributed to the biasing 
effect of negative valence that caused participants to select the paired unfamiliar 
face, contrary to task instruction. With longer latency, the biasing effect of negative 
valence was corrected, so that responses to the faces of negative persons were as 
accurate as responses to positive faces. 
A speculative explanation for the effect of response latency can be offered, as 
follows. It is necessary to consider first how facial familiarity is detected. Farah, 
O’Reilly, and Vecera (1993) suggested that facial familiarity might be detected when 
any semantic information associated with the face becomes activated. There is an 
alternative view: the Burton, Bruce, and Johnston (1990) model of face recognition 
states that familiarity is detected when activation at the Person Identity Node 
reaches a threshold. This node is an a-modal representation of the concept of the 
person, and does not itself store any semantic information, but is connected to other 
nodes representing semantics. The concept that familiarity is detected when the 
Person Identity Node reaches a threshold was based on the observation of a 
‘‘familiar-only’’ response that occurs when a face can be deemed familiar but the 
participant is not aware of any semantic information. However, there is the possibility 
that several items of semantic information might be activated, each one below 
threshold for awareness, but together adding up to sufficient activation to declare the 
face familiar. So, even when the familiar-only response occurred, familiarity may still 
have been detected from the activation of semantic information. Also, the participant 
might have access to affective information concerning their attitude towards the 
person, and this might be sufficient to declare the face familiar. On balance, it seems 
likely that detection of facial familiarity depends on the (maybe unaware) retrieval of 
semantic or affective information associated with the person. 
Given that facial familiarity may be detected from the existence of any 
semantic or affective information associated with the person, it is relevant to consider 
the relative timescale of retrieval of these two types of information. Zajonc’s affective 
primacy hypothesis (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1980; see Zajonc, 2001, for a 
review) states that affective information becomes available before semantics. Some 
support for this hypothesis stems from Bargh et al. (1989) who reported that the 
valence of masked stimuli could be detected with a shorter exposure duration than 
semantic meaning, suggesting that valence may be more strongly connected and 
more readily activated than semantic information. If this is the case, then valence 
may well become available before semantics. It should also be noted that affective 
priming has been observed with zero or negative stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
between prime and target (e.g., De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Hermans et al., 2001; 
Klauer et al., 1997; Musch & Klauer, 2001) whereas semantic priming requires a 
positive SOA. All of these lines of evidence suggest that affective information about a 
stimulus is activated more swiftly than semantic information. 
Applied to the present series of experiments, the affective primacy hypothesis 
has the implication that valence exerted a stronger influence on shorter latency 
responses than on longer latency responses. On shorter latency responses, negative 
valence associated with the famous person led participants to select the unfamiliar 
face, and semantics were not sufficiently activated to contradict this decision. On the 
longer latency trials, semantic information pointed at the famous face, creating a 
conflict between the valence information and the semantic information. Assuming 
that a decision mechanism placed more weight on the semantic information, this 
could explain why responses to negative-disliked faces were at least as accurate as 
responses to positive-liked faces at longer response latency. The assumption that a 
decision mechanism placed more weight on semantics than affect seems reasonable 
- given the perception that a face generates a negative valence, but at the same time 
the face is known to have, e.g., a certain occupation, it is obvious that the face 
belongs to a famous person. 
It remains to be explained why negative valence associated with a famous 
person should lead to the selection of the paired unfamiliar face. One possible 
mechanism is based on the mis-application of the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 
1980; see Zajonc, 2001, for a review), which states that a familiar stimulus is 
preferred over an unfamiliar stimulus, all other things being equal. Participants may 
have conceived a preference for one face in each pair, assumed that preference 
indicated familiarity, and so selected the preferred face as likely to be the famous 
face. Alternatively, participants might have simply selected the face they preferred 
without any assumption that preference denotes familiarity. Either way, when the 
famous person was negative-disliked, the unfamiliar face was preferred and so was 
selected. 
Preference could have been detected in many ways. In an fMRI study 
conducted by Pizzagalli, Koenig, Regard, and Lehmann (1998), participants were 
asked to observe previously unfamiliar faces for 450 ms each, and subsequently rate 
the faces as liked or disliked. Liked and disliked faces activated different neuronal 
populations, with the centre of activation for disliked faces being more to the right 
than the centre of activation for liked faces. Pizzagalli et al. (2002) reported that the 
N170 ERP component that has been frequently associated with face processing was 
larger in amplitude for liked than disliked faces. Another possibility is that liked and 
disliked faces had different effects on the amygdala, e.g., Whalen et al. (1998) 
observed that fearful facial expressions perceived without awareness of the 
expression resulted in higher amygdale activation than happy facial expressions. 
These are just three possibilities: any mechanism for detecting preference between 
two faces could have generated the observed effect in the present experiments. 
The observation of more accurate responses to negative than positive faces 
in the longer latency trials of Experiment 1 suggests that the biasing effect of 
negative valence might not merely be corrected when semantics were also available, 
but actually over-corrected. This could occur if the familiarity decision mechanism, 
assumed to place more weight on semantics than valence, had corrected the 
valence signal to make it consistent with the semantic signal. If this correction was 
strong then a negative face might generate a stronger preference than a positive 
face on the longer latency trials. Combined with the semantic information pointing at 
the famous face, an over-corrected preference signal could have generated the 
observed effect of more accurate familiarity detection from negative than positive 
faces. 
Experiment 3 examined the possibility of over-correction for the biasing effect 
of valence in an affective priming paradigm, using masked 17 ms famous faces as 
primes and clearly visible pleasant or unpleasant words as targets. Results 
supported the concept of over-correction when participants’ strategy in attempting to 
perceive the masked faces caused recognition of the misleading effect of prime 
valence for the required response to the target. 
Several directions for future research are suggested by the experiments 
reported here. The speed with which the valence associated with a famous person 
becomes active, and may be subsequently corrected, could be estimated by 
including various backward mask durations. The conditions of strategic set under 
which correction is applied could also be systematically examined and may shed 
light on the mechanism of correction. It would be of interest to invite prosopagnosic 
participants to perform modified versions of these experiments: given ample 
evidence of covert face recognition in the form of activation of semantic information, 
it seems likely that prosopagnosics would be able to activate emotional information 
associated with famous faces of whose identity there was no awareness. 
Other factors may have influenced the accuracy of participant choices, for 
example, face familiarity, attractiveness and distinctiveness, and these could be 
examined by collecting ratings from experimental participants. The experiments 
reported here could all be repeated with other masked stimuli; one obvious choice 
would be names rather than faces of famous and unfamiliar persons. 
Several conclusions may be drawn. The most basic is that famous faces 
presented very briefly and masked can be identified without awareness of facial 
familiarity. A more interesting conclusion is that negative participant attitude towards 
the famous person has different effects on a familiarity decision at different response 
latencies: familiarity is less likely to be detected a shorter latency than at longer 
latency. Consistent with the affective priming literature, it appears that affective 
responses are influenced by temporal factors.  
Appendix A. Stimuli 
Experiment 1 
Film/TV actors: Woody Allen, Gillian Anderson, Jennifer Aniston, Sandra 
Bullock, Michael Caine, Jim Carrey, Sean Connery, Kevin Costner, Tom Cruise, 
Jamie Lee Curtis, Robert deNiro, Leonardo Dicaprio, Michael Douglas, David 
Duchovny, Harrison Ford, Sarah Michelle Gellar, Richard Gere, Mel Gibson, Hugh 
Grant, Anthony Hopkins, Liz Hurley, Bruce Lee, Marilyn Monroe, Demi Moore, Roger 
Moore, Jack Nicholson, Brad Pitt, Oliver Reed, Burt Reynolds, Julia Roberts, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, William Shatner, Sylvester Stallone, Sharon Stone, Liz Taylor, 
John Travolta, Bruce Willis, Catherine Zeta-Jones. 
Pop stars: Damon Albarn, Victoria Beckham, Liam Gallagher, Geri Halliwell, 
Janet Jackson, Michael Jackson, Mick Jagger, Elton John, John Lennon, Jennifer 
Lopez, Madonna, Freddie Mercury, George Michael, Kylie Minogue, Elvis Presley, 
Cliff Richard, Robbie Williams. 
Comedians: Rowan Atkinson, Craig Charles, Martin Clunes, Harry Enfield, 
Stephen Fry, Joanna Lumley, Nicholas Lyndhurst, Neil Morrissey. 
Royal family: Sarah Ferguson, Prince Andrew, Prince Charles. 
Politicians: Gerry Adams, Jeffrey Archer, Cherie Blair, Tony Blair, George W. 
Bush, Bill Clinton, William Hague, Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, J.F. Kennedy, Ken 
Livingston, John Major, John Prescott, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher. 
TV presenters: Jeremy Beadle, Cilla Black, Paul Daniels, Charlie Dimmock, 
Chris Evans, Judy Finnigan, Bruce Forsyth, Rolf Harris, Clive James, Des Lynam, 
Richard Madeley, Michael Parkinson, Anne Robinson, Chris Tarrant, Alan 
Titchmarsh, Carol Vordeman, Terry Wogan. 
Sports: Boris Becker, David Beckham, Paul Gascoigne, O.J. Simpson, Mike 
Tyson.  
Other: Richard Branson (entrepreneur), Stephen Hawking (scientist), Osama 
Bin Laden. 
Faces excluded from analysis: Charles Bronson, Kathy Burke, John Cleese, 
Glenn Close, Jodie Foster, Dawn French, Tom Hanks, Woody Harrelson, Lenny 
Henry, Myra Hindley, David Jason, Hugh Laurie, Paul Mccartney, Eddie Murphy, 
Liam Neeson, Michael Palin, Michelle Pfeiffer, Jennifer Saunders, Robin Williams, 
Princess Diana. 
Experiment 2 
Film/TV actors: Russell Crowe, Tom Cruise. 
Pop stars: Liam Gallagher, Geri Halliwell, Whitney Houston, Michael Jackson, 
Victoria Beckham, Cliff Richard, Britney Spears, Robbie Williams. 
Royal family: Sarah Ferguson, Camilla Parker-Bowles, Prince Charles. 
Politicians: Tony Blair, G.W. Bush, William Hague, John Major, Colin Powell, 
John Prescott, Margaret Thatcher, Anne Widdecombe. 
TV presenters: Michael Barrymore, Jeremy Beadle, Bill Clinton, Paul Daniels, 
Chris Evans, Jeremy Paxman, Anne Robinson. 
Other: Naomi Campbell (model). 
Faces excluded from analysis: Woody Allen, Yasser Arafat, David Beckham, 
Cilla Black, Cherie Blair, Helena Bonham-Carter, Gordon Brown, Jim Carrey, Cher, 
Puff Daddy, Danny DeVito, Leonardo DiCaprio, David Duchovny, Clint Eastwood, 
Eminem, Bruce Forsyth, Sarah-Michelle Gellar, Hugh Grant, Rutger Hauer, Liz 
Hurley, Janet Jackson, Samuel L. Jackson, Mick Jagger, Elton John, Ross Kemp, 
Annie Lennox, Ken Livingston, Jennifer Lopez, Richard Madeley, Rik Mayall, Ally 
McBeal, Ewan McGregor, George Michael, Liza Minelli, Mike Myers, Leonard Nimoy, 
Gwynneth Paltrow, Luciano Pavarotti, Alan Rickman, Jonathan Ross, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, O.J. Simpson, Iain Duncan Smith, Sylvester Stallone, Patrick 
Stewart, Barbra Streisand, Mike Tyson, Oprah Winfrey, Terry Wogan, Princess 
Anne, The Queen. 
Experiment 3 
All faces included: Michael Barrymore, Tony Blair, Naomi Campbell, Chris 
Evans, Liam Gallagher, Geri Halliwell, John Major, Cliff Richard, Anne Robinson, 
Margaret Thatcher. 
Appendix B. Examples of stimuli and the mask 
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